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INTRODUCTION

The following article was written and accepted for publication before recent
events, especially concerning Apple's refusal to decode the cell phone of one of

I am indebted to Rory Donnelly for extensive research assistance on this paper and to Stephen
Saltzburg for comments on a previous draft. It was written after a stimulating dialogue with Peter
Raven-Hansen, though he is not party to its failings.
This article was written and posted on SSRN on May 11, 2015 before the terrorist attacks in
San Bernardino took place on December 2, 2015. It hence does not deal with the legal issues that
were raised when a court ordered Apple to heed the FBI's request that it enable the FBI to read the
messages stored on the cell phone of one of the two terrorists who were shot dead after they killed
14 people. Nothing that followed made me find that I should modify the article. On the contrary.
The tragic events seem to confirm what I noted before they took place. Frankly, several of the
observations qualify as being outright prescient.
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the San Bernardino terrorists. The following lines address these developments. I
saw no reason to change the article itself.
The director of the FBI stated that it has gone "dark" since Apple started to
provide its customers with end to end encryption that only the sender and
receivers can encrypt. Those who do not trust the FBI should note that the
current director James Comey, risked being fired in order to prevent the Bush
Administration from implementing a surveillance program he considered was in
violation of the Constitution.' Moreover, these doubters should note also that
Apple itself claimed that its new encryption was unbreakable.
In short,
terrorists, kidnappers, and drug lords who were greatly hampered by being
unable to communicate with others without the NSA, CIA, or FBI capturing their
messages-now seemed to have a phone that provided them with a secure line of
communication as well as a reliable place to store information about targets,
participants, and so on, vastly improving their operational capabilities. In
response, the FBI asked Apple to help it decrypt one such phone, the one used by
the terrorist who killed 14 people in San Bernardino.2 Apple refused; the court
agreed with the FBI and ordered Apple to comply.

3

Apple refused to abide by

4

the court's order.
It is appealing the court's ruling, but meanwhile the
information in the terrorist's phone was losing its value as the trails go colder.
True, in March 2016 the FBI reported that it found a way to de-encrypt the
Apple phone without Apple's help. However, the pro and con arguments still
deserve full attention, because Apple is seeking to close the open window the
FBI uncovered and Apple and other high tech companies are producing and
selling other encryption devices for all kinds of electronic means of
communication as well as storage of data, for instance for cloud storage.
Moreover, Apple's lawyers and public relations machine launched a
campaign to convince the public that it should be allowed to continue to sell its
phone with the new encryption powers to all comers all over the world. The
campaign is using what is known as 'throwing in the kitchen sink'; accordingly

1.
Alina Selukh, Lawful Hacking: Should, Or Can, The FBI Learn To
Overcome
Encryption
Itself?,
NPR
(April
19,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/
sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/19/474842912/lawful-hacking-should-or-can-the-fbi-learn-toovercome-encryption-itself.
3.
Kim Zetter, Magistrate Orders Apple to Help FBI Hack San Bernardino Shooter's
Phone, WIRED (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/magistrate-orders-apple-to-helpfbi-hack-phone-of-san-bernardino-shooter/.
4.
Eric Lichtblau and Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino
Gunman's
iPhone,
NY
TIMES
(Feb.
17,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/18/technology/apple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bemardino.html?_r=0.
5.
Devlin Barrett and Daisuke Wakabayashi, FBI Opens San Bernardino
Shooter's iPhone; U.S. Drops Demand on Apple, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 28, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-unlocks-terrorists-iphone-without-apples-help- 1459202353.
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Apple does not rely on one argument or two, but a handful, adding some more
every other week, including some very far-fetched ones.
Actually the Constitution is quite clear on the matter at hand. The Fourth
Amendment does not state that the government may not "search" phones, homes,
6
papers and persons; it merely bans "unreasonable" searches. Moreover, the
Constitution provides a mechanism for determining what searches are
reasonable: the courts. 7

In the case of the phone of the dead San Bernardino

terrorists, the courts ruled that the search is reasonable.8 Apple argues that this
matter should not be decided by the courts but by Congress.9 This is obviously a
disingenuous proposal because it is very well known that Congress is so
polarized it cannot attend to most anything. And if it did, it would take many
months. Most obvious, dealing with cases is the job of courts, not Congress.
Apple argues that the FBI is seeking to violate its First amendment rights,
because courts recognized codes as a form of speech. However, no right is
absolute. Famously, one cannot shout fire in a crowded theater, precisely
because such a shout may cost many lives. Apple also argues that the
government might be able to prevent some speech but not make Apple say what
it refuses to say, which is what is called for if Apple is required to write a code
needed to open the terrorist's phone. However the courts allowed such a
requirement very often when public safety is involved. For instance, they require
warning labels on cigarette packages and content labeling on foods and
medications, among many others.
Lawyers argue that the government cannot make Apple work for it, impose
costs on it, that such imposition would amount to "taking" (under the Fifth
amendment) or even slavery (in violation of the Thirteenth amendment). These
arguments have been tested by the courts on several occasions because
practically all regulations the government issues-including those involving the
protection of children, consumers, employees and the public-exact some costs.
Apple surely can afford decode a phone whose code it forged.
Above all, Apple argues that if it decodes this phone everyone's privacy will
be endangered.1o This assumes that it would disclose how it decoded its own
phone, rather than subject this code to high power encryption.
High tech corporations and their supporters are concerned that if a key were
created, the software would be stolen or leaked. Cook warned that

6.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
8.
See Zetter, supra note 3.
9.
See Katie Benner, Eric Lichtblau, and Nick Wingfield, Apple Goes to Court, and F.B.I
Presses Congress to Settle iPhone Privacy Fight, NY TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/technology/apple-unlock-iphone-fbi-san-bernardinobrief html.
10. See Lichtblau and Benner, supra note 4.
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[i]n the wrong hands, this software-which does not exist today-would
have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone's physical
possession ... The FBI may use different words to describe this tool,
but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in
this way would undeniably create a backdoor.
And while the
government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is
no way to guarantee such control."
In response, I suggested on March 7, 2016 that Apple (and other high-tech
corporations) leave the encryption software as it is-not introduce a vulnerability
or a backdoor-but develop a key to unlock phones, a key they would keep.
Thus, once a court orders that a given phone must be unlocked, the FBI would
bring it to Apple (or Google or whatever other high tech corporation is
involved)-and they will unlock the phones they produced, and turn over to the
FBI any information that's found-but not the key.12 (To apply the same idea to
phones still in the hands of bad actors requires considerable additional
collaboration between the FBI and the high tech corporations, but the same
principle could be applied).
Several Al experts commented on this suggestion. Many thought that
although Apple has the technical capability to create a key, the real issue would
be keeping it secure. Steve Bellovin from Columbia University's department of
computer science responded that "a key can be readily available or it can be
secure, it can't be both." According to Phillip Schrodt, a senior research
scientist, " . . . the problem is not the technology, it is people getting careless

about how they use the technology." David Bantz, Chief Information Architect
for the University of Alaska system, noted that "NYC and [the] FBI have
hundreds of phones they want to unlock. That would entail a process involving
many people and loading the OS on many phones. That makes it possible maybe
even likely that one of those people entrusted with that power is coerced or
bribed or is clumsy enough to put it in the hands of criminals."' 3 I was surprised
to hear during a meeting on May 11, 2016 at the Council of Foreign Relations (a
rare one, on the record) District Attorney Vance informing the audience that until
September 2014 his office was able to routinely send phones to Apple; Apple
would open them and send back the information within a day or two.1 4

The

reason Apple stopped, Vance implied, was that in September 2014, it started

11. Tim Cook, "A Message to Our Customers," (February 16, 2016) accessed March 29,
2016 at http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/.
12. COMMUNITARIAN OBSERVATIONS, (March 7, 2016) https://communitariannetwork.org
/sites/communitariannetwork.org/files/downloads/CommObMarch72016.pdf
13. COMMUNITARIAN OBSERVATIONS, (March 18, 2016) https://communitariannetwork.org/
sites/communitariannetwork.org/files/downloads/CommObMarchl 82016.pdf
14. "Privacy and Security in a Digital Age," May 11, 2016, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS http://www.cfr.org/privacy/privacy-security-digital-age/p37845.
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advertising that it was the only company that sold phones whose encryption
could not be broken.' 5 It seems that concerns for profits, a fully legitimate
concern, played a key role in Apple's sudden refusal to cooperate with law
enforcement and national security authorities.
In response to the repeated claim by high-tech corporations that there is no
way such a key can be kept secure, even if it never left their premises and was
protected by their own high powered encryption-I note that Coca Cola kept its
formula secret for many decades. And that leaks about secrets from the FBI,
during the last 25 years, have been very rare. And that if the key was 'leaked,'
high tech corporations would modify their encryption software by patching it up,
as they often do, and develop new keys. In effect this is what Apple sought to do
when it learned that the FBI found a way to unlock Apple's iPhone. Most
importantly, I agree with Vance, who argued that one must weigh "the risk of
maintaining the ability to open a phone by the company ... versus ... the
consequence to law enforcement of not being able to access those phones.' 6
The answer seems self-evident.
I am sure Apple will come up with more arguments, still. All these
arguments should be sorted out. However, at the end of the day it should not be
up to CEOs seeking to maximize profits to have the final say in matters
concerning high risk to public safety. Apple is not above the law. And its
managers should note that when the next major terrorist attack takes place,
whether or not it includes a dirty bomb-we are surely to learn that Apple's
phones facilitated the attack. This should give pause to Apple's shareholders
and customers. It is likely to hurt Apple's bottom line.
II.

ULTIMATE ENCRYPTION

Tech companies are increasingly adopting what I call "ultimate encryption"
(UE), that is, encryption schemes in which only the sender and the receiver of
the communication can decrypt the message. Hence, tech companies are unable
to comply when authorities present a search warrant, even if the warrant is fully
authorized by a court and based on the government having provided a sufficient
level of particularized suspicion. Such a scheme is also provided by tech
companies for select forms of storing of information.
Beginning in 2014, Apple and Google moved to encrypt their customers'
stored data in this way by default. 17 This is the case for Apple's laptop and
desktop computers, for which Apple's Yosemite operating system encrypts the

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Allison Grande, Apple, Google To Face Legal Backlash To Encryption Plan,
LAw360 (Sept. 25, 2014, 2:12 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/580697/apple-google-to-facelegal-backlash-to-encryption-plan.
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contents of a computer's hard drive by default, as well as all data stored on the
iPhone.1 9 UE is provided for communications and transactions, by Facebookowned messaging service Whatsapp, Apple messaging service iMessage, and
20
Apple video-calling service Facetime. Yahoo and Google are likewise moving
21
to adapt UE encryption for their popular email services. Others are very likely
to follow.
As a result, these information databases and flows are extremely private.
Indeed, if users forget their passwords, the tech companies are unable to help
them regain access to the information. UE makes it much more difficult for the
public authorities, such as the NSA and FBI, to obtain this information pursuant
to lawful authority. In Apple's own words, "we wouldn't be able to comply with
a wiretap order even if we wanted to." 22 According to Apple, while for "iOS

devices running iOS versions earlier than iOS 8.0, upon receipt of a valid search
warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, Apple can extract certain
categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices," for newer devices,
"Apple will not perform iOS data extractions as data extraction tools are no
longer effective. The files to be extracted are protected by an encryption key that
is tied to the user's passcode, which Apple does not possess."2 3
Reference to encryption "by default" means that UE is provided in such a
form that the users have to take no particular step to benefit from it. UE is builtin, though it can be disabled if users wish for some reason to avoid it. There is
considerable evidence from other fields that when systems move from opt-in to

18.
System,

Alex Hern, Apple Defies FBI and Offers Encryption by Default on New Operating
THE

GUARDIAN

(Oct.

17,

2014),

http://www.theguardian.com/

technology/2014/oct/17/apple-defies-fbi-encryption-mac-osx.
19. Kevin Poulsen, Apple's IPhone Encryption is a Godsend, Even if Cops Hate It, WIRED
(Oct. 8, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/golden-key/.
20. Nicole Arce, WhatsApp Encryption Has Just Made It More Difficult for Gov't to Spy on
You, TECH TIMES (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/20515/20141119/whatsappencryption-has-just-made-it-more-difficult-for-gov-t-to-spy-on-you.htm;
LEGAL
PROCESS
GUIDELINES, APPLE (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.apple.com/tw/privacy/docs/legal-process-

guidelines-emeia.pdf.
21. Tom Lowenthal, Yahoo's End-to-End Email Promises GreaterProtectionfor Journalists,
PBS (Apr. 9, 2015), http://mediashift.org/idealab/2015/04/yahoos-end-to-email-promises-greaterprotection-for-joumnalists/.
22. https://www.apple.com/privacy/privacy-built-in/.
PRIVACY,
APPLE
https://www.
apple.com/privacy/privacy-built-in/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
23. LEGAL
PROCESS
GUIDELINES,
APPLE
apple.com/privacy/docs/legal-process-guidelines-us.pdf.
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opt-out, there is a very high degree of increased use. 24 One should expect
25
extremely few, if any, users to opt out of UE.
While the Stored Communications Act requires that companies provide
26
access to law enforcement data that they store, the widespread introduction of
UE is possible because companies are not obligated to store the data in the first
place: the U.S. does not have mandatory data retention laws, meaning that
companies are under no legal obligation to archive their customers' activities for
possible law enforcement access.27 (The European Union had such a law, but it
was invalidated by a court in 2014 and has yet to be reintroduced.28
Public authorities have expressed alarm about these developments. FBI
Director James Comey, for example, has warned that "encryption threatens to
lead all of us to a very dark place," as the "recent default encryption settings and
encrypted devices and networks," that is, UE, "will have very serious
consequences for law enforcement and national security agencies at all levels."29
Public authorities refer to what I call UE as forcing police and intelligence
agencies to "go dark;" be blinded might be an appropriate phrase. In Comey's
words, "if the bad guys don't back up their phones routinely, or if they opt out of
uploading to the cloud, the data will only be found on the encrypted devices
themselves.... Sophisticated criminals will come to count on these means of
evading detection. It's the equivalent of a closet that can't be opened. A safe that
can't be cracked." 30 Likewise, British Prime Minister David Cameron has asked,
"Do we want to allow a means of communication between people which even in
extremis, with a signed warrant from the home secretary personally, that we

24. See, e.g., David McKenzie, "Enhanced Active Choice: Utilizing Behavioral Economics
to Increase Program Take-up," World Bank, April 29 2013, accessed May 5 2015 at
http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/enhanced-active-choice-utilizing-behavioraleconomics-increase-program-take-0. See Hern, supra note 18 (stating that boxes marked "Turn on
FileVault disk encryption," and "Allow my iCloud account to unlock my disk" are preselected).
25. See David McKenzie, Enhanced Active Choice: Utilizing Behavioral Economics to
Increase
Program
Take-up,
WORLD
BANK
(Apr.
29,
2013),
http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/enhanced-active-choice-utilizing-behavioraleconomics-increase-program-take-0.
26. 18 U.S.C. §2701 (2012).
27. United States,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(May
5,
2015),
https://www.eff.org/issues/mandatory-data-retention/us (last visted June 21, 2016).
28. Francesco Guarascio, EU Executive Plans No New Data Retention Law, REUTERS (Mar
12, 2015, 2:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/12/us-eu-data-telecommunicationsiduskbn0m82co20150312.
29. James Comey, Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Speech at the Brookings Institution
Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course? (Oct. 16, 2014).
30. James Comey, "Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision
Course?" (Speech, Brookings Institution Washington, D.C., October 16, 2014) accessed April 24
2015 at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safetyon-a-collision-course. Id.
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. My answer to that question is: 'No we must not."'3 1 And US

Attorney General Eric Holder has stated that it is "fully possible to permit law
enforcement to do its job while still adequately protecting personal privacy."32
Further, Holder stated, "What concerns me about this is companies marketing
something expressly to allow people to place themselves beyond the law."33
Some computer experts hold that these statements are exaggerated; that UE is
merely greatly increasing the costs and time authorities must invest in gaining
access rather than being completely shut out. 34 All that follows applies even if
these observations are true.
The consequences of the introduction of UE to massive and routine use has
been acknowledged by some in the industry. 35 For instance, the then-Senior
Legal Director of Human Rights for Yahoo!, Ebele Okobi, recognized that
making communications over the internet "immune" to any kind of law
enforcement poses serious negative implications, raising the prospect that private
companies will be unaccountable to elected governments, and that a total lack of
policing of the internet can facilitate abusive behavior and threaten, rather than
36
protect, human rights.
Others defend these developments on technical and
normative grounds. For example, technology reporter Alex Hem argues that "far
from being unacceptable, the ability to have a conversation which the
government cannot eavesdrop on is a crucial part of what it means to live in a

31. Christopher Hope, Spies should be able to monitor all online messaging, says David
Cameron, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internetsecurity/ 1134062 1/Spies-should-be-able-to-monitor-all-online-messaging-says-davidCameron.html.
32. Id.
33. Julia Edwards, U.S. Attorney General Criticizes Apple, Google Data Encryption,
REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/30/us-usasmartphones-holder-idUSKCNOHP22P20140930.
34. See Declan McCullagh & Jennifer Van Grove, Apple's iMessage Encryption Trips Up
Feds' Surveillance, CNET (Apr. 4, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/apples-imessageencryption-trips-up-feds-surveillance/ ("Christopher Soghoian, a senior policy analyst at the
American Civil Liberties Union, said. . . 'Apple's service is not designed to be government-proof.
It's much more difficult to intercept than a telephone call or a text message' that federal agents are
used to . . . .' Apple's privacy policy authorizes the company to divulge customers' information
about customers to law enforcement when 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' or to 'comply with
the legal process.).
35. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Defending an Unowned Internet; Opportunities for
Technology, Policy, and Corporations at Harvard Law School (Feb. 3, 2014, 5:00 PM),
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/2014/02/defending an unownedinternet (discussing broadly
the questions of balancing private and public interests by a government facing an "unowned"
internet that cannot be properly policed).
36. "Defending an Unowned Internet Opportunities for Technology, Policy, and
Corporations," (Panel Discussion, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA) February 3, 2014, accessed
May 5 2015 at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/2014/02/defendingan unowned internet. Id.
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And the Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that

"privacy comes at a cost." 38

In the following pages I first outline a communitarian normative position
that I suggest one ought to apply in deliberating such matters (Part III).39 I then

suggest specific legal grounds under which Congress or the courts might ban
UE. (Part IV).40 The article closes by examining the arguments of those who
favor UE despite the harm it poses to security and public safety, and my
1
response to these arguments. (Part V).4

III. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

A.

Liberal Communitarianism

This article draws on a liberal communitarian philosophy, which assumes
that we, as a nation, face two fully legitimate normative and legal claimsnational security and individual privacy-and that neither can be maximized nor
fully reconciled, as there is an inevitable tension between these two claims.42 It
thus follows that some balance must be worked out between the conflicting
claims. That is, the liberal communitarian model assumes from the outset that
the nation is committed to both individual rights and the advancement of the
common good, and that neither should be assumed to a priori trump the other.43

The liberal communitarian philosophy is dedicated to achieving a balance
between individual rights and social responsibilities, which emanates from the
need to serve the common good.44 Liberal communitarians thus take for granted
that deliberations about legitimate public policy ought to start with the
assumption that privacy must be balanced with concern for national security,

37. Alex Hem, How has David Cameron Caused a Storm Over Encryption?, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 15, 2015, 10:26 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/15/david-cameronencryption-anti-terror-laws (promoting conversational privacy as a foundation of living in a
democratic country).
38. Cindy Cohn, Nine Epic Failures of Regulating Cryptography, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Sept.
26,
2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/nine-epic-failuresregulating-cryptography (quoting Riley v. California 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014)).
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See infra Part V.
42. Simon Dawes, Interview with Amitai Etzioni: A Communitarian Approach to Press
Freedom, Privacy and National Security, MEDIA THEORY, HISTORY, AND REGULATION (Feb. 2,
2014), https://smdawes.wordpress.com/2014/07/02/interview-with-amitai-etzioni-a-communitarianapproach-to-press-freedom-privacy-and-national-security/ ("Liberal communitarianism starts with
the assumption that the public's right to privacy must be balanced with concern for national
security . . rather than from the position that any breach of privacy contravenes an inviolable basic
right.").
43. See id.
44. See id.
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rather than from the position that privacy intrusions are ipso facto a violation of a
basic right or freedom.
The Fourth Amendment provides an important text for the liberal
communitarian philosophy when it states that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."4 5 By banning only unreasonable
searches and seizures, it recognizes that there are reasonable ones-those that
serve the common good (or, to use a term more familiar to the legal community,
the public interest). 46
The Fourth Amendment recognizes the right of the people "to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures," and mandates that "no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause." 47 Thus, the Amendment recognizes that
searches may be conducted when police secure a warrant based on probable
cause.48 At the same time, the amendment bans only "unreasonable searches and
seizures," and thus implicitly recognizes a category of "reasonable" searches that
may be used to promote public safety even without a warrant based on probable
cause. 49 That is, the very text speaks of two sides, and hence, a balance between
competing interests. This interpretation has repeatedly been affirmed by the
Supreme Court. 50 This contrasts starkly with the First Amendment, which states

unequivocally that Congress shall make "no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech."
The Supreme Court has used the "the balancing of competing interests" to
determine whether to favor privacy or security, 52 allowing such privacy
intrusions as the warrantless entry of police into a private house to pursue a
fleeing armed robbery suspect, 53 warrantless drug and alcohol testing of train
engineers in the wake of a series of train accidents,54 and even compulsory DNA
55
sampling of those arrested based on probable cause of serious crimes.

45. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
46. See generally Alexander A. Reinhart, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1461, 1469-73 (2010) (discussing what, exactly, a "reasonable
search" is under the Fourth Amendment in a varying contexts with a wide variety of public interests
in mind).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948).
51. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
52. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700, n.12 (White, J., concurring) (citing Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979)).
53. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
54. Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (1989).
55. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
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Within History

Given that there was no new major attack on the US homeland since 9/11,
and following an increase in libertarian sentiment and the Snowden
revelations-there has been a considerable shift in public sentiment and that of
elected officials against government surveillance. There is growing pressure to
reduce security measures, especially those introduced under the USA-PATRIOT
56
Act. However, one should note that (a) ISIS has not been effectively countered
so far since rising in late 2013 indeed it is spreading to more countries and even
continents. (b) A considerable number of Western fighters have gained combat
training and experience while fighting with ISIS and other jihadist groups in Iraq
and Syria. Thousands of these fighters can enter the US without even the
minimal screening provided by visas because they are US citizens or nationals of
countries such as France, Germany, and Britain that participate in the Visa
Waiver Program.
(c) These foreign fighters need to be monitored, in ways
approved by law and the courts, to determine who they call overseas, whether
they are building networks with other trained terrorists, and what access they
have to weapons and bomb-making materials.
Such measures may be
impossible, however, if they use easily available UE that requires no
technological expertise. (d) The Boston Marathon bombing reminds us that the
US is not immune to the kind of attacks that occurred in 2014 in Paris, London,
and Copenhagen among other Western cities. Indeed, I suggest that it will only
take one more major attack in the US for the public to swing back to demanding

56. David Domke et al., Going Public as Political Strategy: The Bush Administration, an
Echoing Press, and Passage of the Patriot Act, 23 POLITICAL COMM. 291, 292 (Feb. 27, 2007)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584600600808844 (citing Edward Epstein, House Defies Bush, Votes to
Repeal

Part

of

Patriot

Act,

SAN

FRANCISCO

CHRONICLE

(June

16,

2005),

http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/House-defies-Bush-votes-to-repeal-part-of-2627813.php;
Susan Goering, Roll Back the Infringement on Civil Liberties; Reviewing the Patriot Act,
BALTIMORE
SUN
(June
16,
2005),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-0616/news/0506160085_1_patriot-act-act-permanent-seize-property).
57. For. See Peter R. Neumann, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/IraqNow Exceeds 20,000;
Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s, THE INT'L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALISATION
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE (Jan. 26, 2015), http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaqnow-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s (providing details on the number of
Western fighters and the likelihood they will return to commit terrorist acts); Jamie Crawford and
Laura Koran, U.S. Officials: Foreigners Flock to Fight for ISIS, CNN (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/10/politics/isis-foreign-fighters-combat/; Daniel Byman and Jeremy
Shapiro, Homeward Bound? Don't Hype the Threat of Returning Jihadists, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Nov.-Dec.
2014),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142025/daniel-byman-and-jeremyshapiro/homeward-bound; Thomas Hegghammer, Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining
Variation in Western Jihadists'Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting, AMERICAN POL.
SCI.
REV.,
(Feb.
2013),
http://hegghammer.com/_files/Hegghammer_ShouldI stay or should I_go.pdf.
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more security. It seems a poor time to provide terrorists with the ability to
communicate and store information with impunity.
C.

The Crux of the Matter

One may grant that the introduction of UE is taking place at a time of
somewhat heightened security risks, but still wonder what the implications are
for private actors, such as Apple and Google, that are introducing UE. The
Constitution guides us in determining whether or not the government is acting
reasonably, which searches it may carry out legally, and which are banned. The
Constitution does not hold that private actors have to enable the government to
carry out reasonable searches. However, if we reflect on the challenge at hand in
normative terms, this observation suggests that the nation can find itself in a
dilemma in which it is heads you win, tails, I lose. That is, searches may either
be deemed by the courts as unreasonable and hence banned, or as reasonablebut frustrated by the private sector. In line with the liberal communitarian
approach briefly outlined above, one looks for ways to better serve both security
and liberty.
IV. POSSIBLE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR BANNING UE

This article next suggests four legal grounds on which the courts or
Congress could build if they sought to ban the use of UE. All require some
interpretation or extending the appeal or meaning of the law or the Constitution,
but these are minor compared to such extrapolations that have often taken place
in the past. If one can forge a right to privacy out of the "penumbra" of the
Constitution, surely one can similarly forge an obligation of the private sector to
comply with warrant requirements in order to keep the public secure.5
A.

Precedentfor Requiring WarrantCompliance

The 1990s, during which computer technology developed rapidly, witnessed
a number of major controversies over surveillance and information security,
sometimes referred to as the "crypto wars." 59 In 1994, Congress passed the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which
required telecommunications carriers to ensure the government's ability to
"intercept . . . all wire and electronic communications" as well as "call-

58. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
59. Julian Hattem, 'Crypto Wars' Return to Congress, THE HILL (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/221147-crypto-wars-return-to-congress.
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identifying information." 60 The law in effect required "telephone companies to
redesign their network architectures to make it easier for law enforcement to
wiretap digital telephone calls." 6' This act was expanded in 2005 to include
"certain broadband and interconnected voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
services" such as Skype, as these "can essentially replace conventional
telecommunications services currently subject to wiretap rules."62 The United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld this order in a 2-1 vote in
2006.63 (However, subsequent efforts by the government in 201064 and in 201365

to further broaden CALEA failed.)
Now, all that is needed is to extend the normative and legal concepts that
underlie these laws to cover encrypted communication and data storage. In
effect, for UE to be outlawed.
B. Inherently DangerousProduct
Another rationale for curbing the introduction of UE by the private sector is
that it is "inherently dangerous." In legal terms, this entails an "instrumentality
or product that poses a risk of danger stemming from its nature and not from a
defect." 66 This term is typically used in product liability referencing to the
67
danger posed by a product to the consumer. In some cases, the conception that
some products are inherently dangerous led beyond posing liability on those who

60. "SEC. 103. ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS," Ask CALEA, February
11 2011, accessed May 5 2015 athttp://askcalea.fbi.gov/calea/103.html. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)
(2012).
61. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/calea (last visited May 5, 2015).
62. FED. COMMC'N COMM'N, FCC REQUIRES CERTAIN BROADBAND AND VoIP PROVIDERS
To
ACCOMMODATE
WIRETAPS
(Aug.
5,
2005),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
attachmatch/DOC-260434Al.pdf.
63. D.C. Circuit Affirms FCC CALEA Broadband Order, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE:
ADVISORIES
&
BLOGS
(June
13,
2006),
www.dwt.com/advisories/
DC Circuit Affirms FCCCALEABroadbandOrder06132006/. See also American Council
on Educ. v. Fed. Comm'n Comm'n, 451 F.3d 226, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (denying the petition and
upholding the Commission's interpretation in the order as lawful).
64. Charlie Savage, U.S. Is Working To Ease Wiretaps On the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
65. Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws, N.Y. TIMES (May 7,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/politics.
66. Inherently Dangerous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY
OF LAW
(1996),
http://dictionary.findlaw.com/defmition/inherently-dangerous.html (last visited February 10, 2016).
67. LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL LAW SCH., ProductsLiability Law: An Overview, in WEX,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/productsliability (last visited June, 21, 2016).
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68

make them to banning such products outright. Plastic guns are an example of a
product particularly relevant, because like UE they deal with public safety.
In December 2013, Congress renewed a ban on plastic guns that can
evade detection by airport metal detectors.69 This ban was first introduced under
the Reagan Administration in 1988, and was renewed and amended in 2003.70 It
makes it "unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, sell, ship, deliver,
possess, transfer, or receive any firearm" that is undetectable by "walk-through
metal detector," or any firearm component that, when "subjected to inspection
by the types of x-ray machines commonly used at airports, does not generate an
image that accurately depicts the shape of the component."' Congressional
Republicans and even the National Rifle Association (NRA) have not opposed
this ban. (On the contrary, the existing ban has been criticized for not covering
plastic weapons which include a detachable metal part, even if that part is not
required to operate the weapon, and Senate Democrats unsuccessfully pushed for
an amendment requiring that plastic weapons include a non-detachable metal
)

part.72

In recent years, plastic weapons have become more of a security risk
due to advances in 3-D printing technology, which have made possible do-ityourself manufacturing of increasingly sophisticated plastic weapons, beginning
73
with the single-shot "Liberator" pistol in 2013.
Some lawmakers are now
74
calling for a more comprehensive ban on all 3-D printed weapons.
In short, when called for, Congress has acted to protect public safety by
banning a product, a move that has been supported by both parties in a period
they rarely agree on policy matters or any other. There seems to be no legal or

68.

See, e.g., David Butler, Victory: Ban on Dangerous Magnets Approved, CONSUMERS

UNION (Sept. 26, 2014), https://consumersunion.org/2014/09/victory-ban-on-dangerous-magnets-

approved.
69. Alan Fram, Associated Press, Congress Renews Plastic Gun Ban for Decade,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2013), www.breitbart.com/news/daaj40e80 1.
70. The Nation: Reagan Signs Bill Banning Plastic Guns, Los ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 11,
1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988- 11-1 1/news/mn-5 10_1plastic-guns; Fram, supra note 69.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(1) (2012). See also WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32842, GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION 111 (2012).
72. Associated Press, House Passes Plastic Gun Ban, POLITICO (Dec. 3, 2013, 5:00 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/plastic-gun-firearm-ban-100601.
73. Andy Greenberg, Meet the 'Liberator':Test-Firing The World's First Fully 3D-Printed
Gun, FORBES (May 5, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/05/
meet-the-liberator-test-firing-the-worlds-first-fully-3d-printed-gun/#a638ffb5 11e6.
74. Andy Greenberg, Bill to Ban Undetectable 3D Printed Guns Is Coming Back, WIRED
(Apr. 6, 2015, 7:00AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/bill-ban-undetectable-3-d-printed-gunscoming-back.
75. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Ban on Microbeads Proves Easy to Pass Through Pipeline,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/science/ban-on-microbeadsproves-easy-to-pass-through-pipeline.html (discussing Congress' unanimous ban on the sale of
products containing microbeads due to the chemicals they attract once these small plastic bits enter
the waterways); Lyndsey Layton & Annys Shin, Lawmakers Agree to Ban Toxins in Children's
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logical reason UE could not be subject to same kind of ban. (One may argue that
other nations might produce UE and provide this service to the public. In other
such situations the US used various means to pressure nations not to proceed,
and of course if they did, it still banned Americans from using such services, for
instance, child pornography.)
Granted, such banning of UE is surely going to face a great amount of
opposition on ideological grounds (especially by libertarians and civil
libertarians) and on business grounds (in the wake of the Snowden revelations,
tech companies held that they must provide their clients extra defense against the
US government or lose their business, especially overseas). Hence, it would be
much better if the tech companies could be persuaded to voluntarily modify UE
so that when faced with a warrant, they could accommodate law enforcementrather than force them to do by acts of Congress or court rulings.
For a fine precedent for such an approach, one can see the actions of the
manufacturers of advanced color printers, a technology that could have made it
rather easy to produce counterfeit money. The Secret Service, which is
responsible for the "integrity of [US] currency," has noted that "methods used in
counterfeiting operations have evolved over the years from the traditional
method of offset printing to color copiers and, more recently, to scanners,
computers and inkjet printers," which has made it possible "for even unskilled
operators to produce high-resolution color reproductions," which has in turn
"increased the incidence of the manufacturing and passing of office machine
notes." 76
To deal with this threat, printer manufacturers have cooperated with the
government and agreed voluntarily to incorporate anti-counterfeiting measures
into their products.
This includes yellow dot patterns that allow the US
government to determine the serial number of the printer used to print a
document, making it easier to track counterfeited notes back to their source.

Items,

WASH.
POST
(July
29,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/07/28/AR2008072802586.html (noting Congress' agreement to ban certain
harmful toxins found in some plastic children's products).
76. "Know Your Money: Advanced Technologies in Counterfeiting," United States Secret
Service,
2014,
accessed
May
5
2015
at
http://www.
secretservice.gov/money technologies.shtml.Know Your Money, CITY OF WEST FARGO (Oct. 21,
2013), http://www.westfargond.gov/Home/Details.aspx?ID=1053 (citing KNOW YOUR MONEY,
U.S. SECRET SERVICE, www.secretservice.gov/data/knowyourmoneyapril08.pdf (last visited June

21, 2016)).
77. See, e.g., Jason Tuohey, Government Uses Color Laser Printer Technology to Track
Documents, PCWORLD, http://www.pcworld.com/article/118664/article.html (last visited May 5,

2015); Jamie Beckett, HP Helps U.S.

Clamp Down on Counterfeiting, HP (Sept., 2003),

http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2003/julysept/counterfeit.html.
78. Tuohey, supra note 77.
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Xerox "pioneered this technology," in the 1980s.79 Other corporations such as
Hewlett-Packard (HP) have been open about their cooperation with the US
government to combat counterfeiting, with HP stating that its "imaging and
printing business made the effort to integrate anti-counterfeiting measures into
[its] devices." 80
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, which secured a list of participating
manufacturers in 2008 through a Freedom of Information Act request and
decoded the yellow dot pattern for one device,si wams that this "purported effort
to identify counterfeiters" means that a "communication tool you're using in
everyday life could become a tool for government surveillance." 82 However, a
Secret Service spokesperson has stated that this technology is "strictly a
countermeasure to prevent illegal activity specific to counterfeiting." 83
UE deserves the yellow dot treatment: the tech corporations should be able
to abide by court orders and law enforcement should use such power only to
fight terrorism and major crimes just as the TSA is allowed to perform
administrative searches at airports "'for the purpose of detecting weapons or
explosives and not in order to uncover other types of contraband."' 84
C.

Compelling Public Interest

Still another rationale for banning UE is that the need for the government to
gain access to communications relating to terrorism or major crimes is
compelling enough to outweigh a suspect's privacy interest. The Supreme Court
has carved out a large category of searches that it deemed "reasonable" even in
the absence of a search warrant based on individualized suspicion, that of
searches justified by "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement." 85 These include routine inspections by personnel from the

79. Jason Tuohey, "Government Uses Color Laser Printer Technology to Track Documents,"
PCWorld,
November
22
2014,
Accessed
May
5
2015
at
http://www.
pcworld.com/article/ 118664/article.html. Id.

80.

"HP Helps U.S. Clamp Down on Counterfeiting," HP, September 2003, Accessed May 5

2015 at http://www.hpl.hp.com/news/2003/julysept/counterfeit.html. Beckett, supra note 77.
81. Seth Schoen, Secret Code in Color PrintersLets Government Track You, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2005), https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2005/10/16.
82. Printer
Dots,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Mar.
16,
2011),
https://www.eff.org/foia/foia-printer-dots.
83. Mike Musgrove, Sleuths Crack Tracking Code Discovered in Color Printers, THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Oct.
19,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2005/10/18/AR2005101801663.html.
84. United States v. Fofana, 620 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (quoting United
States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 902 (1986)).
85. New Jersey v. T.L.0, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration;86 warrantless searches by
administrative authorities in public schools, government offices, and prisons;
drug testing of public transportation and other government employees;88 and
inspection of automobile junkyards. 89 In all of these cases, the search is
considered reasonable because a court found the government's regulatory interest
outweighs the individual's privacy interest. 90 The Supreme Court allowed
suspicionless, warrantless drug and alcohol testing of train engineers in the wake
of a series of train accidents, for example, based on the government's
"compelling" interest in ensuring "the safety of the traveling public," 91 and
allowed sobriety checkpoints to catch drunk drivers due to the "magnitude of the
drunken driving problem [and] the States' interest in eradicating it." 92
If such searches are reasonable even in the absence of a search warrant
and allow for wide searches of a large number of innocent people, surely the
same applies to searchers when the government does in fact have a warrant,
issued by a court that ruled that there was sufficient individualized suspicion to
issue such a warrant. Needless to say, the government has a compelling interest
in fighting the terrorism threat, particularly if one accepts that counterterrorism is
indeed different from the "normal need for law enforcement.
(The same
points hold for major crimes such as murder and kidnapping).
D.

Obstruction ofJustice

Finally, one may justify banning UE on the grounds that it entails
obstruction of justice. (This might be a less strong ground than those outlined so
far, but it is included in the tradition of throwing everything in, including the
kitchen sink.) According to the federal statutes that deal with this concept,94
obstruction of justice may be summarized as "any act that is intended to interfere
with the administration of justice," including "any attempt to hinder the
discovery, apprehension, conviction or punishment of anyone who has

86. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, n.16 (1978) (stating OSHA
searches without consent are still subject to the warrant requirement, but with a lower probable
cause standard).
87. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (stating that teachers do not need probable cause to
search students, but the search must be reasonable under the circumstances).
88. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1988) (holding
that "suspicionless" testing of government employees applying for promotions is reasonable).
89. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708-09, 711 (1987) (holding that
warrantless inspection of junkyard that met certain criteria was reasonable).
90. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; Nat'l Treasury, 489 U.S. at 679;
Burger, 482 U.S. at 708.
91. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 621 (1989).
92. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
93. See Amtai Etzioni, A Liberal Comm unitarianParadigmfor Counterterrorism,49 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 330, 347-56 (2014).
94. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (2012).
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committed a crime."95 The association of UE with obstruction of justice is
suggested by the remarks of Attorney General Holder that tech companies are
"thwarting our ability" to "lawfully obtain information in the course of an
investigation,"96 and by FBI Director Comey that "cases could be stalled" and
"[j]ustice may be denied, because of a locked phone or an encrypted hard
drive."97
One may argue that UE does not necessarily expose tech companies
themselves to this charge because obstruction of justice only applies when there
is a "specific intent to obstruct the proceeding." For federal criminal cases, there
is the additional requirement "that a proceeding was actually pending at the time
[of the obstruction] and there must be a nexus between the defendant's endeavor
to obstruct justice and the proceeding, and the defendant must have knowledge
of this nexus." 98 Thus, tech companies that deprive themselves of the ability to
access their customers' encrypted data in advance-one might say-are not
vulnerable to a charge of obstructing justice, as they could be shown to not to
have intent to obstruct justice.
In response, one notes that the tech companies greatly expanded their
encryption schemes in reaction to of the extent of government surveillance, and
thus in effect moved to obstruct law enforcement. As we have seen, where UE
was once available only to tech-savvy individuals, Apple, Google and others are
now making it a default measure in data storage and communications that is now
very widely available and requires people to exert themselves only if for some
reason they seek to override it.

V.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

A.

Ask the Sender or Recipient?

Defenders of UE might argue that the government could force suspects to
decrypt the information stored in their smart phones or the communications they

95. What You Should Know about Obstruction of Justice, OHIO ST. B. Ass'N (Nov. 23,
2014), https://www.ohiobar.org/forpublic/resources/awyoucanuse/pages/awyoucanuse- 132.aspx.
96. Eric Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks by Attorney General at Holder at the Biannual
Global Alliance Conference Against Child Sexual Abuse Outline (Sept. 30, 2014) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-attorney-general-holder-biannual-globalalliance-conference-against-child-sexual).
97. James Comey, Dir. of Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Going Dark: Are Technology,
Privacy,
and
Public
Safety
on
a
Collision
Course?
(Oct.
16,
2014)
http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-acollision-course.
98. Id.
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sent or received. 99 In cases relating to child pornography and mortgage fraud,
courts held that the government may force suspects to decrypt stored
information. (These rulings were not unequivocal, but rather hinged on the fact
that the government already knew "with reasonable particularity"' 0 0 of the
"existence and location of subpoenaed documents rulings," that is, the existence
of the data was a "foregone conclusion."' 0 '
Thus, the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply on the basis that "the Fifth
Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every
sort of incriminating evidence."1 02 On the other hand, another case upheld a
Fifth Amendment defense against forcing a suspect to decrypt their files, on the
basis that there was no "foregone conclusion."'1 03
However, even if the government may legally compel a suspect to
decrypt their files or communications, this approach is vastly inferior from a
national security and law enforcement viewpoint, because it prevents the
government from gaining information about the suspect's contacts, plans, and
preparations before they are tipped off that the government is on to them.
B.

Badfor the Goose, Badfor the Gander?

Defenders of encryption argue that backdoors, key recovery, or other limits
on encryption that facilitate the authorities' access to otherwise secure data are
themselves "inherently dangerous," as they may also be used by foreign
governments or cyber criminals to bypass encryption used by the US
government, companies, or private citizens.104 While this is technically correct,

99. See generally Dan Terzian, The Fifth Amendment, Encryption, and the Forgotten State
Interest, 61 UCLA L. REV. DIsC. 298 (2014) (analyzing the complex legal issues surrounding
decryption of data in criminal investigations).
100. Boucher, 2009 WL 424718, at 3 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
101. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher. Accessed May 5 2015 at
http://volokh.com/posts/1235508933.shtml. Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411
(1976)).
102. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408.
103. See Orin Kerr, Eleventh Circuit Finds Fifth Amendment Right Against Self Incrimination
ProtectsAgainst Being Forced to Decrypt Hard Drive Contents, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb.
23, 2012, 6:45 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/02/23/eleventh-circuit-finds-fifth-amendment-rightagainst-self-incrimination-not-to-decrypt-encyrpted-computer/ (quoting decision holding that there
was no foregone conclusion whether the files existed in the known location). See also U.S. v. Doe
(In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 25, 2011), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.eff.org/cases/us-v-doe-re-grand-jury-subpoena-duces-tecumdated-march-25-2011 (summarizing case where Eleventh Circuit ruled that decrypting data is
testimonial and protected by the Constitution).
104. See, e.g. Sarah Andrews, Who Holds the Key? - A Comparative Study of US and
European Encryption Policies, J. INFO. L. & TECH., http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/
law/elj/jilt/2000_2/andrews/ (explaining that defenders of encryption find backdoors, key recovery,
and other limitations are dangerous, expensive, and insecure).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2016

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 4
580

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 67: 5 61

it ignores the vital question of how much any given means to bypass encryption
will weaken that encryption, and to what extent this risk to personal security is
manageable and acceptable given corresponding benefits to law enforcement and
national security.
To fully respond to this challenge, one must study the various measures that
are being considered to allow the authorities to discharge their duties without
unduly weakening encryption, which is a highly technical subject. Moreover, it
is, to a significant extent, subject to future development rather than merely
evaluating available measures. Suffice it to say, it seems reasonable to expect
tech companies be able to rise to this challenge and develop such measures. And
even if cyber criminals found ways to benefits from any limit on encryption
introduced for helping the government, such leaks could be patched and others
implemented to comply with the government's legitimate needs.
C. Imported Encryption?
American tech companies argue that in a competitive global marketplace, if

they do not provide UE to their customers, foreign companies will do so, and
they will lose a competitive advantage-and the public will not be more secure.
That, due to the open and global nature of the internet, encryption software
cannot be kept out of the US or out of the hands of terrorists. 105 If one follows
this logic, however, then Apple and Google should market medications used
overseas but not approved by FDA, and distill and distribute heroin-foreigners
do it ... Indeed, there are numerous products foreign firms make and provide
that the US seeks to keep out of the hands of Americans. One may say that UE
software is different because importation of software is much more difficult to
bar than regular products. However, the US effectively bars the downloading of
child pornography106 and spyware and adware. o7 The use of malware was first

successfully prosecuted in the 1980s under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
which has since been updated. 08 Many states also have laws against "computer

105. See, e.g., Sabri Ben-Achour, FBI Head Concerned Over Apple and Google Encryption,
17, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/2014/10/17/tech/fbi-headconcerned-over-apple-and-google-encryption (highlighting the global nature of encryption
software).
106. See Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, Child Pornographyon the Internet, CENTER
FOR
PROBLEM-ORIENTED
POLICING
(2006),
http://www.popcenter.org/problems/child
pornography/print/ (noting that between 1996 and 2006, "ISPs have removed some 20,000
pornographic images of children from the web.").
107. See, e.g., Alan F. Blakley, Daniel B. Garrie & Matthew J. Armstrong, Coddling Spies:
Why the Law Doesn't Adequately Address Computer Spyware, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 25
(2005).
108. See Timothy B. Lee, How A Grad Student Trying to Build the First Botnet Brought the
Internet to its Knees, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2013/11/01/how-a-grad-student-trying-to-build-the-first-botnet-brought-the-internet-toits-knees/ (outlining Robert Morris's malware in the mid-1980s that was successfully prosecuted
MARKETPLACE (Oct.
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contaminants" such as malware and spyware.1 09 In September 2014, the maker
of StealthGenie, a smartphone app used mainly by jealous partners to spy on
each other's calls and locations, was arrested after being indicted for "charges of
conspiracy, sale of a surreptitious interception device and advertising a
surreptitious interception device," in violation of the Wiretap Act."1 0 If UE is
made illegal, most Americans will not use it, and criminals and terrorists will
tend to avoid it because they realize that if they do use it-they will call attention
to themselves, and be subject to other modes of surveillance. Moreover, if the
US curbed the use of UE, one should expect that most if not all other
governments would be quite keen, for their own reasons, to follow suit.
D.

How Liberty is Lost

The ideological case in favor of UE draws on the numerous changes
made in American law and that of numerous other countries following the 9/11
terrorist attack that have been considered excessive, the Snowden revelations, the
absence of major terrorist attacks on US mainland for more than a decade, and
the rise of general support for libertarian and civil libertarian ideas. These are
summed up by the argument that the US is sacrificing liberty to enhance
safety.'1 1
A common narrative goes as follows: first, the government, in the name
of national security or some other such cause, trims some rights, which raises

under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). See also PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, OFFICE OF
EDUC.
EXEC.
OFFICE
FOR
U.S.
ATT'YS
at
1-3,
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf (exploring
the history of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, noting its successive updates).

LEGAL

109. Computer Crime Statutes, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last updated June 12,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/computerhacking-and-unauthorized-access-

laws/ct/386c9aa872d5dfecc76db8da95bl38afb86535e6982415e57d60075d9c32fea73cefba624c53a
72cf7eO71dl620f5649cd90198f6ef2fc26feda4628da36cf8f.aspx (providing list of states that have
laws against computer contaminants).

110. Craig Timber & Matt Zapotosky, Maker of StealthGenie, an App Used for Spying, is
Indicted

in

Virginia,

WASH.

POST

(Sept.

29,

2014),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/

business/technology/make-of-app-used-for-spying-indicted-in-virginia/2014/09/29/816b45b8-4805Il e4-a046-120a8a855cca-story.html.
111. See Sen. Patrick Leahy & Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, The Case for NSA Reform, POLITICO
(Oct. 28, 2013, 9:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/leahy-sensenbrenner-nsa-reform098953 (introducing a counteraction to the USA PATRIOT act that arguably threatens citizens'
liberty); Stephanie Condon, NSA Abuses Contradict Obama and Congressional Claims of
Oversight, CBS NEWS (Aug. 18, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nsa-abusescontradict-obama-and-congressional-claims-of-oversight/ (exploring incidents of NSA surveillance
violations); Chris Soghoian, US Surveillance Law May Poorly ProtectNew Text Message Services,
ACLU (Jan. 8, 2013, 9:44 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/us-surveillance-law-may-poorly-protectnew-text-message-services (explaining that the government can receive access to seemingly private
conversations via platforms like text message, Facebook, and SnapChat).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2016

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 4
582

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 67: 561

little alarm at the time. Then a few other rights are curtailed. Soon, more rights
are lost and, gradually, the whole institutional structure on which liberal
democracy rests tumbles. (Statements that the US has already been turned into a
police state, that Americans lost their right to privacy and free speech, and so on
and on, are so overblown they need no refutation).
However, there are very few instances of nations that lost their liberty
because of such incremental erosion of rights. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that typically the relationship runs the other way around: when democratic
institutions and policies do not provide an adequate response to new challengesthey are undermined.112 There are many cases in which liberty was lost when
governments did not provide basic security to their people. The Afghans
welcomed the Taliban when their country was in anarchy following the retreat of
the USSR.1 3 The Russians welcomed Putin when their country suffered a major
crime wave after the collapse of the USSR.1 4 The Egyptians welcomed military
rule after two years of revolutionary upheaval. Many in Libya, Syria, and Iraq
miss the safety of the old regimes.
Following the 9/11 attacks, when the public was most concerned about
additional attacks from sleeper terrorist cells on short order, many Americans
were willing to support a strong government, including one that would set aside
many basic individual rights." 5 78% of Americans expressed willingness to
"give up certain freedoms to gain security.""16
However, in the subsequent period, as the government did take
numerous and varying measures to enhance public safety and no new attacks
occurred, the public gradually restored its commitment to the rights-centered
regime. As the government vigorously enacted measures to protect the publicthe public's support for constitutional democracy was reaffirmed. That is, when
the government reacted firmly to a major challenge, support for constitutional
democracy was sustained rather than undermined. In short, to protect our rights,
the government needs to provide a reasonable level of security.

112. AMITAI ETZIONI, How PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT?: FREEDOM VERSUS SECURITY
IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 12-14 (Routledge 2004).
113. Who Are the Taliban?, BBC (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-southasia- 11451718.
114. Seth Mydans, 20 Years After Soviet Fall, Some Look Back Longingly, NY TIMES (Aug.
18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/europe/19russia.html?_r=0.
115. See generally Which Freedoms Will Americans Trade for Security?, GALLUP (Jun. 11,
2002),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/6196/which-freedoms-will-americans-trade-security.aspx
(outlining polls indicating Americans' willingness to set aside personal freedoms in the name of
greater security).
116. "Which Freedoms Will Americans Trade for Security?" Gallup, June 11, 2002, Accessed
May
5
2015
at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/6196/which-freedoms-will-americans-tradesecurity.aspx. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Civil libertarians object to the key new security measures that have been
introduced in the wake of the 2001 attacks on the US homeland because they are
not based on particularized, individualized suspicion recognized by a court.
They argue that these measures violate the constitutional requirement that
separates legal from illegal searches. When the same libertarians then support
moves by private companies that frustrate security measures that do meet this
standard, in full, their position seems quite unreasonable.
Putting aside the question on what legal grounds one may ban UE, there
is a major normative issue that is the subtext of the preceding deliberations. That
is, there is a profound normative position that finds expression in the Fourth
Amendment. Namely, that the government be curbed from searching peopleunless there is a clear reason for it to proceed (and a mechanism is provided to
determine what is reasonable). This amendment is often understood to protect
individuals from an abusive, overreaching government, as we have known
through much of human history and still see evidenced in many parts of the
world-and, some hold, in the US. However, one should not overlook that the
same text also fully recognized that the government may have fully legal and
fully justified, legitimate reasons to conduct searches. Hence, when private
parties develop, introduce, or promote technologies that make it impossible (or
"only" very difficult) for the government to carry out searches courts ruled
legitimate, these parties frustrate the essence of the Fourth Amendment, even if
technically they may not be required by law to cooperate. It is time for the law
to catch up with what good judgment indicates: ban ultimate encryption.
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